The author, who has already published a book of English references and allusions to Thomas More in the period 1500-1640, continues his collection up to 1700, setting each citation in its context. He notes that English opinion regarding More in this period tended to be of a polemical nature.

Ethical descriptivism is the view that all ethical properties are descriptive properties. Frank Jackson has proposed an argument for this view which begins with the premise that the ethical supervenes on the descriptive, any worlds that differ ethically must differ also descriptively. This paper observes that Jackson's argument has a curious structure, taking a linguistic detour between metaphysical starting and ending points, and raises some worries stemming from this. It then proposes an improved version of the argument, which (...) avoids these worries, and responds to some potential objections to this version of the argument. (shrink)

This is the third selection of major works on the Scottish Enlightenment and includes the same combination of hard-to-find and popular works as in the two previous collections. Contents: An Essay on the Natural Equality of Men [1793] William Lawrence Brown, New introduction by Dr. William Scott 308 pp An Enquiry into the Origin of Moral Virtue [1733] Archibald Campbell 586 pp The Philosophical Works [1765] William Dudgeon, New introduction by David Berman 300 pp Institutes of Moral Philosophy For (...) the use of Students in the College of Edinburgh [1769] Adam Ferguson 340 pp A Comparative view of the State and Faculties of Man with those of the Animal World [1774] John Gregory 426 pp An Apology for the Life and Writings of David Hume, Esq [1777] Samuel Jackson A Letter to Adam Smith, On the Life, Death and Philosophy of his friend David Hume Esq [1777] George Horne (Bishop of Norwich) 252 pp. (shrink)

I critically analyse two causal analyses of seeing, by Frank Jackson and Michael Tye. I show that both are unacceptable. I argue that Jackson's analysis fails because it does not rule out cases of non-seeing. Tye's analysis seems to be superior to Jackson's in this respect, but I show that it too lets in cases of non-seeing. I also show that Tye's proposed solution to a problem for his theory -- which involves a robot that mimics another (...) (unseen) robot -- fails. Finally I show that his 'variability' requirement is not necessary, because there are cases where someone can see an object even though the variability that Tye requires does not exist. (shrink)

Frank Jackson in Perception uses the relation to ground the distinction between direct and indirect perception. He argues that it follows that our perception of physical objects is mediated by perceiving their facing surfaces, and so is indirect. I argue that this is false. Seeing a part of an object is in itself a seeing of the object; there is no indirectness involved. Hence, the relation is an inadequate basis for the direct-indirect distinction. I also argue that claims that (...) we don't, , see objects, are also false. (shrink)

I argue that Frank Jackson's knowledge argument cannot succeed in showing that qualia are epiphenomenal. The reason for this is that there is, given the structure of the argument, an irreconcilable tension between his support for the claim that qualia are non-physical and his conclusion that they are epiphenomenal. The source of the tension is that his argument for the non-physical character of qualia is plausible only on the assumption that they have causal efficacy, while his argument for the (...) epiphenomenal character of qualia is plausible only on the assumption that they are non-physical. Since these two arguments cannot be combined coherently, the most Jackson's argument can establish is that qualia are non-physical. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Although Kairos in Greek mythology is often depicted as the winged son of Zeus who grants to those who lay hold of his single lock of hair their once-in-a-lifetime opportunity, in traditional African American culture, particularly when it comes to speech, Kairos is essentially family. Given how much African American speakers depend on seizing the moment to invoke spiritual connections, emit laughter, and profess the truth, Kairos, or what we might call CPT (“Colored People’s Time”), can be summoned almost (...) at will. One of the African American discourses this article will use to illustrate this point is Call and Response, a verbal exchange in which speakers and listeners attune to one another and to the timeliness of an event. Martin Luther King Jr.’s “I Have a Dream” speech was such an event, but it wouldn’t have been so were it not for the timely responding of his favorite gospel singer, Mahalia Jackson. (shrink)

I argue for a version of the causal analysis of seeing which I call the 'potential information' analysis. I proceed initially by considering some standard causal analyses, those of Tye and Jackson. I show that these analyses are too weak, for they allow cases of hallucination to count as seeing. I argue that what is central to seeing is that our visual experiences provide a means of gaining true beliefs about objects. This, however, does not mean that we must (...) actually gain true beliefs about objects in any particular case. Rather, what must be the case is that a perceiver of our sort could gain true beliefs about objects on the basis of experiences like ours. I defend this analysis against various objections, making important qualifications to it as I do so. (shrink)

Since Descartes’s division of the human subject into mental and physical components in the seventeenth century, there has been a great deal of discussion about how—indeed, whether or not—our mental states bring about our physical behavior. Through historical and contemporary readings, this collection explores this lively and important issue. In four parts, this anthology introduces the problem of mental causation, explores the debate sparked by Donald Davidson's anomalous monism, examines Frank Jackson's knowledge argument for the view that qualia are (...) epiphenomenal, and investigates attempts to employ the controversial concept of supervenience to explain mental causation. (shrink)

Yujin Nagasawa has recently defended Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument from the “inconsistency objection.” The objection claims that the premises of the knowledge argument are inconsistent with qualia epiphenomenalism. Nagasawa defends Jackson by showing that the objection mistakenly assumes a causal theory of phenomenal knowledge. I argue that although this defense might succeed against two versions of the inconsistency objection, mine is unaffected by Nagasawa’s argument, in which case the inconsistency in the knowledge argument remains.

This volume, first published in 1954, is one of three presenting the correspondence of David Hume. It collects letters from 1737 to 1776 which do not appear in J. Y. T. Greig's two volumes of 1932, and offers a rich picture of the man and his age. The correspondents include such famous thinkers as Adam Smith, James Boswell, and Benjamin Franklin.

Frank Jackson endorses epiphenomenalism because he thinks that his knowledge argument undermines physicalism. One of the most interesting criticisms of Jackson's position is what I call the 'inconsistency objection'. The inconsistency objection says that Jackson's position is untenable because epiphenomenalism undermines the knowledge argument. The inconsistency objection has been defended by various philosophers independently, including Michael Watkins, Fredrik Stjernberg, and Neil Campbell. Surprisingly enough, while Jackson himself admits explicitly that the inconsistency objection is 'the most (...) powerful reply to the knowledge argument' he knows of, it has never been discussed critically. The aim of this paper is to evaluate the objection and to identify and consider its implications. The objection is alleged to be based on a causal theory of knowledte. I argue that the objection fails by showing that any causal theory of knowledge is such that it is either false or does not support the inconsistency objection. In order to defend my argument, I offer a hypothesis concerning phenomenal knowledge. (shrink)

Frank Jackson (1982) famously argued, with his so-called Knowledge Argument (KA), that qualia are non-physical. Moreover, he argued that qualia are epiphenomenal. Some have objected that epiphenomenalism is inconsistent with the soundness of KA. One way of developing this objection, following Neil Campbell (2003; 2012), is to argue that epiphenomenalism is at odds with the kind of behavioral evidence that makes the soundness of KA plausible. We argue that Campbell’s claim that epiphenomenalism is inconsistent with the soundness (...) of KA is false. (shrink)

The so-called Disability Paradox arises from the apparent tension between the popular view that disability leads to low well-being and the relatively high life-satisfaction reports of disabled people. Our aim in this essay is to make some progress toward dissolving this alleged paradox by exploring the relationship between disability and various “goods of life”—that is, components of a life that typically make a person’s life go better for her. We focus on four widely recognized goods of life (happiness, rewarding relationships, (...) knowledge, achievement) and four common types of disability (sensory, mobility, intellectual, and social) and systematically examine the extent to which the four disability types are in principle compatible with obtaining the four goods of life. Our findings suggest that that there is a high degree of compatibility. This undermines the widespread view that disabilities, by their very nature, substantially limit a person’s ability to access the goods of life, and it provides some guidance on how to dissolve the Disability Paradox. (shrink)

A collection of major philosophical articles on the problem on consciousness.

Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 90, Issue 1, Page 205-206, March 2012.

Modern epistemology has run into several paradoxes in its efforts to explain how knowledge acquisition can be both socially based and still able to determine objective facts about the world. In this important book, Richmond Campbell attempts to dispel some of these paradoxes, to show how they are ultimately just "illusions of paradox," by developing ideas central to two of the most promising currents in epistemology: feminist epistemology and naturalized epistemology. Campbell's aim is to construct a coherent theory (...) of knowing that is feminist and "naturalized." Illusions of Paradox will be valuable for students and scholars of epistemology and women's studies. (shrink)

_If you were free in doing something and morally responsible for it, you could have done otherwise. That_ _has seemed a pretty firm proposition among the old, new, clear, unclear and other propositions in the_ _philosophical discussion of freedom and determinism. If you were free in what you did, there was an_ _alternative. It is also at least natural to think that if determinism is true, you can never do otherwise than_ _you do. G. E. Moore, that Cambridge reasoner in (...) whose shadow Wittgenstein ought to be standing,_ _considered the matter. He pointed out that even if determinism is true, there remains a sense in which you_ _can still do otherwise than you do: you will do otherwise if you so choose. That, on reflection, is consistent_ _with determinism. The doctrine of the compatibility of freedom and determinism is saved. Joseph Keim_ _Campbell, strong philosopher at Washington State University, provides the latest thinking on this seemingly_ _unavoidable dispute. You do not have to agree that either compatibilism or incompatibilism must be true in_ _order to appreciate the carefulness of his reasoning in this piece of ongoing American philosophy. It_ _requires and repays attention._. (shrink)

In 1973, the Supreme Court of the United States issued Roe v. Wade, a historic and contentious decision that established abortion as a fundamental constitutional right. This ruling protected aborti...

Where Men Hide is a spirited tour of the dark and often dirty places men go to find comfort, camaraderie, relaxation, and escape. Ken Ross's striking photographs and James B. Twitchell's lively analysis trace the evolution of these virtual caves, and question why they are rapidly disappearing. They find that for centuries men have met with each other in underground lairs and clubhouses to conduct business or to bond and indulge in shady entertainments. In these secret dens, certain rules are (...) abandoned while others are obeyed. Twitchell connects the places men hide with figures like Hemingway and Huck Finn, Frederick Jackson Turner's theory of the American frontier, and the mythological interpretations of Joseph Campbell and Robert Bly. Documenting both traditional and contemporary male haunts, Twitchell and Ross examine the provenance, purpose, and appeal of this little-discussed and controversial phenomenon. (shrink)

This article explains the foundation of knowledge acquisition through discourses involving research methodology and research methods; differences between the two concepts is exemplified, with the former (research methodology) addressing philosophical underpinnings around the process of research, and through which human epistemic quest for knowledge is addressed, while the latter (research methods) addresses problems involving the application of qualitative or quantitative techniques (in some cases mixed-methods) in answering the researchers' underpinning research questions / hypothetical postulations. Challenges surrounding research ethics is relevantly (...) addressed with a view of explaining issues needed in ensuring research processes are successfully accomplished through ‘detailed eye for issues’, for example, the application of skills needed to access research participants without inflicting harm unethically. (shrink)

Camp might be said to be a queer object to the extent that it resists any attempt to define it in language. This essay reads Patrick White’s The Twyborn Affair as a demonstration of the more performative and affective understanding of camp that is needed to overcome the conceptual impossibility of camp’s existence in language alone. This essay reconceptualizes camp as a performative and affective social phenomenon by reading the protagonist of White’s text as an exemplary figure who resists disciplinary (...) identity and legibility through a series of camp performances. Camp emerges at the conclusion of this essay as a mediation of a particular subject–object relation, and its emblem is the bandaid. For if shame appears to tyrannize the life of Twyborn’s protagonist, that subjugation is not total: shame’s performativity gives birth to a defiantly camp persona that re-routes shame as shamelessness. Camp advertises itself as a means of living in and living through performances of gender and sexuality. Shame is thus an important resource for both understanding the protagonist of White’s text and understanding the camp politics of queer critique that he embodies. Camp is a queer object that facilitates the healing of the shameful wound afflicting performative identities. (shrink)

Rampant non-factualism is the view that all non-fundamental matters are non-factual, in a sense inspired by Kit Fine (2001). The first half of this paper argues that if we take non-factualism seriously for any matters, such as morality, then we should take rampant non-factualism seriously. The second half of the paper argues that rampant non-factualism makes possible an attractive theory of vagueness. We can give non-factualist accounts of non-fundamental matters that nicely characterize the vagueness they manifest (if any). I suggest (...) that such non-factualist theories dissolve philosophical puzzlement about vagueness. In particular, the approach implies that philosophers should not try to say which of the sorites-paradox-forming claims are true; we should not try to solve the sorites paradox in that sense. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:167 THE HUME LITERATURE FOR 1982 The Hume literature from 1925 to 1976 has been thoroughly covered in my book Fifty Years of Hume Scholarship: A Bibliographical Guide (Edinburgh University Press, 1978; £9.50), which also lists the main earlier writings on Hume. Publications of the years 1977 to 1981 were listed in Hume Studies in previous Novembers. What follows here will bring the record up to the end of (...) 1982. Readers are invited to inform me of any omissions, and to send me offprints of their own articles and reviews. The intention is to maintain a complete bibliographical record of critical work on Hume, by the regular publication in Hume Studies of an annual bibliography, with addenda consisting of items omitted through ignorance in previous years. References to recently-appearing reviews (of books from earlier lists) are given at the end. The following abbreviations of journal titles are used here: APQAmerican Philosophical Quarterly JHIJournal of the History of Ideas JHPJournal of the History of Philosophy JPJournal of Philosophy PASProceedings of the Aristotelian Society PBPhilosophical Books PQPhilosophical Quarterly PRPhilosophical Review RIPRevue Internationale de Philosophie RMReview of Metaphysics TLSTimes Literary Supplement Other abbreviations should be obvious enough, and mainly follow the British Standard (no. 4148). 168 AIKEN, H. D. 'The Originality of Hume's Theory of Obligation', Phil. & Phenomenol. Res. 42, 374-83. BADIA CABRERA, M. A. 'Milagro, testimonio y verdad. El significado de la crítica de Hume', Dialogos (Puerto Rico) 17, 37-52. BAIER, A. 'Hume's Account of our Absurd Passions', JP_ 79, 643-51. [652] BARON, M. 'Hume's Noble Lie: An Account of his Artificial Virtues', Can. J. Phil. 12, 539-55. BERRY, CJ. Hume, Hegel and Human Nature, pt. 2 (55124 ). The Hague, etc. [Hume Studies 9 (1983) 200-3] BERRY, CJ. 'Hume on Rationality in History and Social Life', History & Theory 21, 234-47. BUNZL, M. 'Humean Counterfactuals', JHP 20, 171-7. CALLICOTT, J. B. 'Hume's Is/Ought Dichotomy and the Relation of Ecology to Leopold's Land Ethic', Environmental Ethics 4, 163-74. CAPALDI, N., KING, J. & LIVINGSTON, D. 'The Hume Literature of the 1970s', Philosophical Topics 12, no. 3, 167-92. COLWELL, G.G. 'On Defining Away the Miraculous', Philosophy 57, 327-37. DAVIES, B. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, 52-9 and 108-18. Oxford. DEL BARCO COLLAZOS, J. L. 'Evidencia y verdad en la epistemologia de Hume', Anuario filosófico 15, 175-84. DEL BARCO COLLAZOS, J. L. 'La teoría de la impresión en Hume', Anuario filosofico 15, 85-112. DRAPER, T. 'Hume and Madison: The Secrets of Federalist Paper No. 10', Encounter 58, (Feb.) 34-47. FARR, J. 'Humean Explanations in the Moral Sciences', Inquiry 25, 57-80. FERN, R. L. 'Hume's Critique of Miracles: An Irrelevant Triumph', Relig. Studies 18, 337-54. FITZPATRICK, J. 'Lonergan and Hume [I-IV: various aspects]', New Blackfriars 63, 122-30, 219-28, 275-86, 364-72. 169 FLAGE, D.E. 'Relative Ideas Revisited: A Reply to Thomas', Hume Studies 8, 158-71. FLAGE, D.E. 'Hume's Dualism', Nous 16, 527-41. FLEW, A. 'Another Idea of Necessary Connection', Philosophy 57, 487-94. FLEW, A. '"Hume on Space and Geometry": One Reservation ', Hume Studies 8, 62-5. [66-9] FORBES, D. 'Natural Law and the Scottish Enlightenment', in R. H. Campbell & A. S. Skinner, The Origins and Nature of the Scottish Enlightenment, 186204. Edinburgh. FORCE, J. E. 'Hume and Johnson on Prophecy and Miracles: Historical Context', JH_I 43, 463-75. FRIEMAN, J. 'Boswell Confronts Hume: An Encounter with the Great Infidel', Free Inquiry 2, 22-5. GALGAN, G.J. The Logic of Modernity, 118-36 ('Hume: The Breakdown of Certitude'). New York S London. HALL, R. 'The Hume Literature for 1981', Hume Studies 8, 172-7. HALLER, R. Urteile und Ereignisse, 76-85 ('Humes Analyse'). Munich. HAUSMAN, A. 'It Ain't Necessity, So... (with Apologies to George Gershwin)', Hume Studies 8, 87-101. HILL, E. 'Hume and the Delightful Tragedy Problem', Philosophy 57, 319-26. HOERSTER, N. 'David Hume', in N. Hoerster, Klassiker des philosophischen Denkens, vol. 2, 7-46. Munich. JONES, G. E. 'Vindication, Hume and Induction', Can. J. Phil. 12, 119-29. JONES, P. 'Laughter', PAS... (shrink)

The ‘four famous cruces’ of this satire are as interesting as notorious. I regard the first as solved, since I cannot imagine anybody improving upon Postgate's line 13 . But I find instead a hitherto undetected but quite palpable flaw in the opening words.

“Let no one think that he has sufficiently understood the Scriptures who has not looked after a church with the prophets for a hundred years …. We are beggars. That's for sure.”—Martin Luther.

Empirical studies have suggested that language-capable robots have the persuasive power to shape the shared moral norms based on how they respond to human norm violations. This persuasive power presents cause for concern, but also the opportunity to persuade humans to cultivate their own moral development. We argue that a truly socially integrated and morally competent robot must be willing to communicate its objection to humans’ proposed violations of shared norms by using strategies such as blame-laden rebukes, even if doing (...) so may violate other standing norms, such as politeness. By drawing on Confucian ethics, we argue that a robot’s ability to employ blame-laden moral rebukes to respond to unethical human requests is crucial for cultivating a flourishing “moral ecology” of human–robot interaction. Such positive moral ecology allows human teammates to develop their own moral reflection skills and grow their own virtues. Furthermore, this ability can and should be considered as one criterion for assessing artificial moral agency. Finally, this paper discusses potential implications of the Confucian theories for designing socially integrated and morally competent robots. (shrink)

Is there any important distinction between a law and a theory? Some usages suggest that there is. Thus, everyone speaks of Boyle's Law and of the dynamical theory of gases. But the most summary inquiry will show that the distinction is not maintained consistently by individual authors, still less as between different authors; the terms “Newtonian law” and “theory of gravitation” seem to be used indifferently to denote the same proposition.

The essays in this volume consider how feminism has affected a range of academic disciplines - psychology, art, art history, history, social work and literary criticism. Particular attention is given to certain relationships: feminism and socialism; feminism and deconstruction; men and feminism; academic discourse and wider cultural values and theory and practice. The contributions on literary criticism deal with specific questions within that field, while those on other disciplines adopt a broad approach.

We work under the assumption of the Axiom of Determinacy and associate a measure to each cardinal $\kappa < \aleph_{\varepsilon_0}$ in a recursive definition of a canonical measure assignment. We give algorithmic applications of the existence of such a canonical measure assignment (computation of cofinalities, computation of the Kleinberg sequences associated to the normal ultrafilters on all projective ordinals).